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Abstract: This paper discusses research carried-out on the development and validation of a model-based fault 
detection and isolation (FDI) system for a pneumatically actuated Stewart platform arrangement. The FDI 
scheme is based on combining parity-equation and Kalman filter based techniques. The parity and Kalman filter 
equations are formulated and used to generate residuals that, in turn, are analysed to determine whether faults are 
present in the system.  Details of the design process are given and the experimental results are compared. The 
results demonstrate that both approaches when combined can successfully detect and isolate and in some cases 
accommodate faults associated with the sensors, actuators (servo-valves and piping) and the pneumatic system 
itself.  The work is part of a BAE SYSTEMS’ sponsored project to demonstrate advanced control and diagnosis 
concepts on an industrial application. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The problem of fault detection and isolation 
(FDI) in dynamic processes has received great 
attention, and a large variety of methodologies have 
been studied and developed based upon both 
physical and analytical redundancy. In the first case, 
the system is equipped with redundant physical 
devices, like sensors and actuators, so that if a fault 
occurs, the redundant device replaces the 
functionality of the faulty one. 
Model-based Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) 
utilizes the principles of analytical redundancy to 
first detect deviations from normal behaviour in a 
system, and then to isolate the particular component 
that has a fault. Useful surveys of these and other 
useful FDI methods can be found in Patton, (1997) 
and Venkatasubramaniam et al, (2003). Fig.1 depicts 
a schematic structure of a typical FDI procedure 
using analytical redundancy. The analytical 
approach requires that a residual generator perform a 
validation of the nominal relationships of the 
system, using the actual input, u, and the measured 
output, y. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1: Schematic structure of a FDI procedure 
This is usually achieved by expressing the normal 
system operation in terms of system models. This 
modelling procedure is necessary to have 
relationships between various known or measured 
variables. The work described in this paper aims to 
demonstrate FDI as part of a fault tolerant control 
system on a Stewart-Gough platform comprising six 
pneumatic actuators. The FDI scheme is designed to 
detect and isolate pneumatic and sensor faults using 
model-based fault detection and isolation. As far as 
the authors are aware no such work has been carried 
out on a pneumatic system. 
2. Experimental set-up  
Stewart-Gough platforms (Fig.2) are generally of 
a mechanical design used mainly for position 
control. The design is a parallel mechanism 
consisting of a rigid body mobile plate, connected to 
a fixed base plate and is defined by at least three 
stationary points on the fixed (grounded) base 
connected to six independent legs. The six variable 
length legs are connected to both the base and top 
plate by universal/ball joints in parallel located at 
both ends of the six legs. This allows for the length 
of each leg to be varied. The linear extension and 
retraction of the six cylinders gives the platform six 
degrees of freedom positioning capabilities.  
The design concept of the FDI scheme for the 
full Stewart-Gough platform is first developed using 
a single cylinder set-up. This modular approach is 
adopted so that a robust fault tolerant control scheme 
can be developed off-line (i.e. not attached to the 
Stewart–Gough platform). This modular approach is 
made possible as the Stewart-Gough platform design 
uses six identical pneumatic cylinders. The single 
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actuator set-up is illustrated schematically in Fig.3. 
Initial work was reported in Grewal, (2008).             
Flow from the air supply is governed by the 
servo valve which gives a flow into each of the 
cylinder chambers that is proportional to the voltage 
applied. This results in a differential pressure across 
the cylinder piston causing it to move. The pressures 
are measured via pressure sensors located between 
the valve and cylinder chambers. The overall aim is 
position control, so this is measured via two Linear 
Resistive Transducers (LRT) mounted in the 
cylinder. The second position sensor provides a 
means of redundancy if the primary position 
develops a fault or fails. The schematic also shows 
the xPC Target coupled with Matlab/Simulink, 
which provides a real-time environment for running 
the control and fault detection algorithms. The faults 
considered for this paper are position/pressure 
sensor faults, leaks in pneumatic system, blockages 
in pneumatic system and actuator faults. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2. Stewart-Gough platform set-up 
 
 
Fig.3. Schematic of experimental set-up 
 
3. Modelling of pneumatic system 
The relationship between the air mass flow and 
the pressure changes in the chambers is obtained 
using energy conservation laws (first law of 
thermodynamics), and the force equilibrium is given 
by Newton’s second law. The overall pneumatic 
system can be approximated by equations (1-3), see 
for example Grewal et al (2008). Where Pp is the 
pressure in chamber p, Pn is the pressure in chamber 
n, Vp is the air volume in chamber p, Vn is the air 
volume in chamber in n, Ts is the operating 
temperature, γ is the ratio of specific heat, and R is 
the universal gas constant.  M is the piston mass, A is 
the bore area, x is the position of the piston, and Ff 
represents the frictional forces. K is the servo valve 
constant and v is the voltage input. 
,   (1) 
                                          (2) 
 
4.  Design of FDI scheme 
Fig.1 shows the generic structure of the model-
based fault detection scheme. The method consists 
of detecting faults on the process which includes 
actuators, components and sensors, based on 
measuring the input signal U(t) and the output signal 
Y(t). The detection method uses models to generate 
residuals R(t). The residual evaluation examines the 
residuals for the likelihood of faults and a decision 
rule is applied to determine if faults have occurred. 
In this paper the process model can be based on 
either parity equations or Kalman filters. The main 
function of the FDI scheme is to detect faults typical 
in pneumatic system. Once these faults are detected 
the FDI scheme isolates the fault. The two 
approaches are discussed below. 
 
4.1 The Parity Equation Method 
 
The idea of the parity approach is to rearrange 
the model structure to achieve the best fault isolation 
(i.e. so that the effect of faults is far greater than that 
of the other uncertainties). The desired properties for 
the residual signal are R(t) ≠ 0 if  f(t) ≠ 0.Where R is 
the residual and f is the fault. The pneumatic control 
loop (Fig.4) scheme, which contains the following 
elements: The controller C(s), the proportional valve 
GA(s), the pneumatic actuator GP(s), and the sensor 
GS(s). The proportional valve fault Fa(s) and the 
sensor fault FS(s) can have dynamics, which are 
modelled by the transfer functions Ha(s), and HS(s). 
In addition to the position (feedback) sensor, 
pressure sensors are included in the system to read 
pressure from each chamber of the actuator. These 
are not included in the closed loop system, and are 
shown as Pp(s) and Pn(s) respectively. With the 
pressure sensor faults, shown as FPp(s) and FPn(s), 
again having dynamics modelled by the transfer 
functions HPp(s) and HPn(s). The following 
relationships (equations) can be derived. 
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XS(s)=[GS(s)+HS(s)FS(s)][GA(s)U(s)GP(s)+Ha(s)Fa(s)
GA(s)GP(s)]                                                                    (3)  
                                    
Pnact= [U(s)GA(s)+Ha(s)Fa(s)][Pn(s)+HPn(s)FPn(s)] 
                                                                                (4)                                                         
 
Ppact= [U(s)GA(s)+Ha(s)Fa(s)][Pp(s)+HPp(s)FPp(s)]  
                                                                                         (5)                                                                                                                                                           
 
U(s) =C(s)(V(s)-XS(s))                               (6)                                                   
 
Residuals are formulated from equations (3) to (5) as 
follows 
 
R1=XS(s)-GS(s)GP(s)GA(s)U(s)=HS(s)FS(s)+Ha(s)Fa(s)            
(7) 
 
R2= Pnact - U(s)GA(s)Pn(s)=Ha(s)Fa(s)+HPn(s)FPn(s)                    
                                                                                (8) 
R3 = Ppact -U(s)GA(s)Pp(s)=Ha(s)Fa(s)+HPp(s)FPp(s)                    
                                                                          (9) 
 
Where, GA(s) is modelled by the equations (1) and 
GP(s) by equation (2). It is assumed that the fault 
and sensor transfer functions are all instantaneous. 
 
 
Fig.4. Pneumatic closed loop scheme with intended 
faults 
 
4.2. Observer approach (Kalman filter) 
 
The fundamental idea of the observer approach is 
to reconstruct the outputs of the system from the 
measurements or subsets of measurements with the 
aid of observers or Kalman filters using the 
estimation error or innovation (Frank, 1990). This 
estimation error or innovation is used as a residual 
for the detection and isolation of faults. Given a 
system: 
 
GwBuAxx  (State eq)                     (10) 
 y = Cx + Du + Hw + v    (Measurement eq)      (11) 
  
Where u is the input, w is the process noise, v is 
the measurement white noise with E (ww
T
) =Q, and 
E (vv
T
) =R.It is also assumed that the state and 
measurement noise is uncorrelated, that is, E (wv
T
) = 
0. An optimal estimate of y , yˆ can be provided by 
the Kalman filter equations: 
 
(12)                                                                                             
                                                                              (13) 
                                                           
Where in practice the weightings for process and 
measurement noise (Q and R respectively) are 
chosen heuristically using engineering judgement to 
provide a trade-off between sensitivity to faults, and 
the likelihood of false alarms. The steady-state 
Kalman filter gain L is determined by solving an 
algebraic Riccati equation. This estimator uses the 
known inputs u and the measurement y to generate 
the output and state estimates ŷ and .x

 
 
                      
 
 
 
                             (14) 
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In designing the Kalman filter approach only the 
sensed outputs are considered. These are position 
and pressure difference outputs. The residual 
equations are:  
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Where 
Cpos = [0 1 0], CPd = [1 0 0] 
 
A voter scheme is used to minimize switching 
transients since the isolation of faulty signals is 
achieved through a continuous numerical weighting 
(Broen, 1975). The voter scheme continuously 
determines the output in a manner which 
discriminates against the erroneous signal in favour 
of the other channels. The general form (Fig. 5) of 
the voter scheme is determined using a weighted 
average of its inputs.  
 
 
 
 
Fig.5. Voter scheme 
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Residual
s 
Faults 
Actuat
or 
Plant Position 
sensor (x3) 
Redundant 
sensor (x2) 
Estimated  
position signal 
(x1) 
Pressur
e 
sensor 
(p) 
Pressur
e 
sensor 
(n) 
R1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
R2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
R3 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
R4 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
R5 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
w1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
w2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
w3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
(17
) 
(18
) 
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Where Vout is defined as 
                              (17) 
The numerical properties of the voting scheme is 
given by letting 
 
           
Where wj is given by 
         (18)                            
           (19) 
                   (20) 
Where a is the tolerance parameter and is the 
measure of allowable noise level in a given channel. 
It should be noted the above voting scheme deals 
with three sensor inputs. The Kalman filter estimate 
(x3) and the redundant signal (x2), the third signal is 
taken from the primary signal (x3). 
Table 1 shows the theoretical fault signatures 
using the parity equations and Kalman filter 
approaches of the pneumatic system for various 
faults. These signatures arise from the formulation 
of parity equations and the structure of the observer 
scheme. Where the parity equations residuals (R1, R2 
and R3), are given in equations (7), (8), and (9).  The 
Kalman filter residuals (R4 and R5) are given by 
equations (14), (15), and (16). From Equations (18), 
(19), and (20) further residuals can be generated. 
Basically, if no faults occur the weighted output is 1 
and if a fault occurs in either of the three signals (x1, 
x2 and x3) ( ) 0. In order to comply with the 
Kalman and parity residuals the weighted average 
outputs are inverted (i.e. fault =1, and no fault = 0). 
The residuals are evaluated by processing the 
residual output to acquire the root mean square 
(RMS) of the value over a moving window of N 
samples (Dixon, 2004) as shown:  
 
5,4,3,2,1
2
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 
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kR
k
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R             (21) 
 
 Where Ri(k) is the value of the i
th
 residual at the 
k
th
 sample. Subsequently, the residual RMS value is 
compared with a predetermined fault detection 
threshold 
 
5. Experimental results 
 
In order to demonstrate the FDI scheme using 
parity equations and Kalman filter approaches a 
number of experiments were carried out on the 
Stewart–Gough platform (Fig.3) However, for this 
paper only an actuator fault is considered. The 
demand input to the system is a series of motions 
that represent the 6-degrees of movement. When a 
fault occurs, appropriate (safe) actions need to be 
taken. For the position sensor fault, accommodation 
is possible. This is also the case for the pressure 
sensor. For the other faults the appropriate action is 
to shutdown the rig. 
 
5.1   Actuator fault (control signal loss)  
A fault Fa(s) (see Fig.4) is applied to the 
proportional valve at 20s. The fault injected is that 
the control signal has been disconnected. This is 
physically achieved by means of a switch. Fig.6 
shows the time histories of this experiment. 
Applying the disconnection fault to the control 
signal of the proportional valve has an effect on the 
parity residual (R1), this raises the fault flag. The 
fault has an effect on the pressure sensor parity 
residuals (R2 and R3). Both position and pressure 
difference Kalman residuals (R4 and R5) are affected 
by the actuator fault and their fault flags are raised. 
Residuals w1, w2 and w3 are not affected and the 
respective fault flags remain low. This agrees with 
the fault signatures detailed in Table 1. With this 
particular fault accommodation is not available as 
the control signal to the servo valve of pneumatic 
cylinder 2 is lost. This means that the desired 
positional movement of the rig is inadequate. From 
here (21.62s) the safety sequence is activated and the 
platform is made safe (i.e. brought back to its rest 
position).  
From both methods (Kalman and parity) the 
Kalman approach tracks the fault better with a faster 
fault detection response time. Overall, it is clear that 
the parity equations and the Kalman filter approach 
can detect an actuator fault.  
 
Table 1:  Residual fault signatures  
6. Conclusions 
The paper has described the design, test and 
evaluation of fault detection in a closed loop system 
for an industrial standard pneumatic system. The 
pneumatic system model has been presented and 
manipulated. Parity equations and the Kalman filter 
 
Res 
                                Potential faults 
Act Plant (x3) (x2) (x1) Press  
sen (p) 
Press 
 Sens(n) 
R1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
R2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
R3 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
R4 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
R5 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
w1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
w2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
w3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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approach have been used to generate residuals for 
the purpose of fault detection. An actuator fault 
(control signal loss) scenario has been considered, 
which is typical for a pneumatic operating system. 
The results show that using the described parity 
equation and Kalman filter methods; including the 
weighted average voting scheme (for position sensor 
faults), fault detection and isolation was possible 
from the available measurements. An important 
reason for selecting the parity equation approach is 
that it is a relatively simple design approach. Basic 
equations of the system are used directly and 
compared to the system. The Kalman filter approach 
is more complex as the scheme takes into account 
noise variances. Other faults have been considered 
which include leak faults, air blockages, position 
sensor faults and pressure sensor faults. However, 
their results are not presented due to space 
limitations. The authors believe that applying the 
three schemes allows for better fault detection and 
fault isolation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6. Actuator fault Fa(s) (control signal loss)  
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